A shocking surge in guerrilla violence threatens to undo Colombia’s fragile peace, testing Gustavo Petro’s leadership to the limit.
For a country that has long struggled to emerge from the shadows of civil conflict, Colombia finds itself teetering yet again on the brink of chaos. President Gustavo Petro’s government has declared “war” on the left-wing guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN) following a spate of violence that has claimed over 100 lives and displaced thousands.
The violence, spanning from the Amazon jungles to the volatile border with Venezuela, is a grim reminder that Colombia’s past is never far behind. Over the weekend, images of desperate families fleeing conflict zones evoked haunting echoes of a not-so-distant era when Colombia was synonymous with brutality. The latest bloodshed, driven by rivalries between guerrilla factions over control of the cocaine trade, underscores how deeply entrenched the drug economy remains in the nation’s fabric.
Colombia had been basking in what seemed like a new dawn. The landmark 2016 peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was celebrated globally as a model for conflict resolution. It marked the end of a six-decade war that had claimed nearly half a million lives. For a time, the country enjoyed a tenuous calm, with violence subsiding in most regions.
But peace in Colombia has always been a patchwork quilt, fragile at its seams. While the FARC demobilized, splinter groups refused to lay down arms, controlling key territories and profiting from the cocaine trade. The ELN, the country’s last major guerrilla organization, exploited the vacuum left by FARC’s disarmament, expanding its influence. Other actors, from paramilitary groups to drug cartels, capitalized on the chaos.
Petro, Colombia’s first left-wing president, took office in 2022 on the promise of “total peace,” seeking to end the decades-long cycle of violence through negotiations with armed groups. His approach, though idealistic, drew sharp criticism from sceptics who argued that his conciliatory stance would embolden guerrillas. Those fears appear increasingly prescient.
At the heart of Colombia’s woes lies its status as the world’s largest producer of cocaine. The drug trade has been a perennial engine of violence, funding guerrilla movements and criminal enterprises alike. Efforts to dismantle this illicit economy have proven Sisyphean. While the 2016 peace deal incentivized coca farmers to transition to legal crops, implementation has been uneven, and many returned to coca cultivation under duress from armed groups.
The current crisis stems, in part, from a turf war among these groups, whose leaders view peace negotiations as a threat to their dominance. The ELN, implicated in the recent border clashes that claimed 80 lives, has been particularly aggressive. Its actions betray a confidence that it can act with impunity, unencumbered by Petro’s overtures for dialogue.
Petro’s pivot to a harder line reflects the mounting pressure he faces. Declaring a localized state of “internal unrest” and deploying 5,000 troops to the conflict zones marks a stark departure from his earlier strategy. The president’s opponents have seized on the crisis to critique his leadership. Critics argue that Petro underestimated the resilience of Colombia’s armed groups and overestimated their willingness to negotiate.
Internationally, the crisis tarnishes Colombia’s image as a country on the mend. The exodus of refugees into Venezuela adds a regional dimension, complicating already fraught relations with its neighbour.
Colombia’s past offers sobering lessons. The demobilization of paramilitary groups in the mid-2000s under then-President Álvaro Uribe succeeded in reducing violence temporarily but left behind criminal organizations that morphed into today’s drug cartels. Similarly, the FARC peace deal achieved disarmament but failed to address the structural issues—poverty, inequality, and land disputes—that fuel Colombia’s conflicts.
Petro’s challenge is to break this cycle. His administration must balance military action with robust social policies to address the root causes of violence. This includes accelerating the implementation of land reforms promised under the FARC deal and investing in rural development. Moreover, international support, particularly from the United States, will be crucial in combating the cocaine trade, which underpins much of the violence. Petro’s vision of total peace now risks unravelling unless he can adapt to the stark realities of Colombia’s fragmented landscape.
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