Pending Retribution

The shocking massacre of more than 25 citizens, mostly tourists, in a terror attack in Pahalgam was a grisly reminder that Pakistan’s subterranean war machinery remains alive and well. As the nation seethes for retribution against its hostile neighbour for this wanton and brutal act, the first salvo from the Narendra Modi government has not come across the Line of Control, but through the sluice gates of geopolitics.

India’s decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance with immediate effect marks a historic shift in a bilateral relationship long defined by violent flashpoints but surprisingly resilient agreements. Since its signing in 1960, the IWT has symbolised a threadbare but essential rationality in Indo-Pak relations. Following Pahalgam, that thread has now been deliberately cut.

Though India has not formally abrogated the treaty, it has effectively suspended its spirit and operation. The Modi government has halted data sharing and technical engagements, withdrawn from Indus Commission meetings, and frozen clearances for future hydroelectric projects on the western rivers: the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. India may now also escalate construction of storage infrastructure on these waters - assets it is legally permitted to develop but has historically refrained from maximising. This is a well-calibrated lever of pressure. For Pakistan, where agriculture and drinking water depend heavily on the Indus system, even a partial squeeze can send tremors through its economy. India has cleverly created a situation where Islamabad cannot appeal to international norms without first confronting its continued support for cross-border militancy.

Alongside the treaty’s suspension, India has expelled Pakistan’s military attachés and their support staff from its High Commission in New Delhi. Still, these steps, by the government’s own signalling, are only the prelude.

Economic strangulation has its uses, especially when it plays to India’s hydrological upper hand and growing regional clout. But it cannot be the endgame. The Pahalgam massacre was a calculated provocation designed to test New Delhi’s deterrence. So far, that deterrence looks procedural, not punitive.

A strong military response remains both likely and necessary. The surgical strikes of 2016 and the Balakot air raid in 2019 may have altered the vocabulary of Indian retaliation, but they have not ended Pakistan’s addiction to asymmetric warfare. The message from Pahalgam is that Pakistan’s generals remain confident that India’s threshold for retaliation is high, and that terror can be exported with strategic impunity. That calculus must change. If India seeks to re-establish deterrence and restore the sanctity of its borders and its dead, it must trade maps for munitions. The water wars have begun but they are merely pressure tactics, not punishment.

A calibrated military strike would serve as a kinetic reminder that India’s patience is not infinite. It must hit not just at proxies, but at the infrastructure of terror shielded by Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex. The price of exporting jihad must be made unambiguously steep. While hydrological tools can squeeze, they cannot scare.